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Abstract. A solution on a set of transferable utility (TU) games satisfies strong aggregate
monotonicity (SAM) if every player can improvewhen the grand coalition becomes richer. It
satisfies equal surplus division (ESD) if the solution allows the players to improve equally.
We show that the set of weight systems generating weighted prenucleoli that satisfy SAM
is open, which implies that for weight systems close enough to any regular system, the
weighted prenucleolus satisfies SAM. We also provide a necessary condition for SAM for
symmetrically weighted nucleoli. Moreover, we show that the per capita nucleolus on
balanced games is characterized by single-valuedness (SIVA), translation covariance (TCOV)
and scale covariance (SCOV), and equal adjusted surplus division (EASD), a property that is
comparable to but stronger than ESD. These properties together with ESD characterize the
per capita prenucleolus on larger sets of TU games. EASD and ESD can be transformed to
independence of (adjusted) proportional shifting, and these properties may be generalized for
arbitrary weight systems p to I(A)Sp. We show that the p-weighted prenucleolus on the set
of balanced TU games is characterized by SIVA, TCOV, SCOV, and IASp and on larger sets
by additionally requiring ISp.
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1. Introduction
The core is one of the most important reference solutions for cooperative games. When restricting the attention
to transferable utility (TU) games, there are widely accepted nonempty solutions such as the prenucleolus, a
single-valued solution that is a core selection, that is, selects an element of the core whenever the core is
nonempty. As a solution in its own right, the prenucleolus may be justified by simple and intuitive axioms.
Indeed, in his seminal work, Sobolev [24] proved that the prenucleolus on the set of all TU games with player
sets contained in an infinite universe is characterized by single-valuedness (SIVA), anonymity, translation co-
variance (TCOV), scale covariance (SCOV), and the reduced game property with respect to (w.r.t.) the Davis and
Maschler [3] reduced game. It was shown that the equal treatment property replaces anonymity (Orshan [14]) and
that if the equal treatment property is used, then SIVA and the reduced game property may be replaced by
nonemptiness and the reconfirmation property (Orshan and Sudhölter [15]). However, the infinity assumption of
the potential universe of players is crucial in any of the aforementioned axiomatizations of the prenucleolus. It
was also shown that it is impossible to suitably modify Peleg’s [17] axiomatization of the prekernel that works
for a finite universe of players by replacing the converse reduced game property by some minimality principle
(see Orshan and Sudhölter [15, corollary 3.8]). To our knowledge, there is only one characterization of the (pre)
nucleolus in the literature that does not need varying player sets and consistency. Indeed, Oswald et al. [16]
show that the (pre)nucleolus can be characterized with the help of an independence property and continuity.
For a detailed comparison with the present characterization, we refer to Remark 5.
Our characterizations do not employ continuity, and they also allow us to characterize weighted prenucleoli
rather than just the traditional ones. For symmetrically weighted prenucleoli, there are axiomatizations that
are similar to Sobolev’s [24] axiomatization of the prenucleolus—only the Davis–Maschler reduced game
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has to be replaced by a suitable new reduced game, the definition of which depends on the weight system
(Kleppe et al. [10]). Hence, in this article, we present axiomatizations of the weighted prenucleoli that avoid
references to any kind of reduced game and, instead, make use of the fact that all aforementioned weighted
prenucleoli are core selections.
Moreover, in order to treat TU games that have an empty core (are not balanced), we employ some kind of
monotonicity property in addition. Well-known monotonicity properties that are also satisfied by the core are
aggregate monotonicity (AM), strong aggregate monotonicity (SAM), and equal surplus division (ESD). A solution
satisfies AM if there is an element according to which nobody is worse off compared with any proposal of the
solution of the original TU game if only the worth of the grand coalition is increased. It satisfies ESD if the
additional worth of the grand coalition may be distributed equally among the players. For the formal
definitions of these intuitive properties, see Section 2. It is well known (see, e.g., Calleja and Llerena [2]) that
the per capita prenucleolus satisfies ESD (and, hence, SAM and AM). However, when considering the class of
balanced games, ESD is a rather weak property. Indeed, when diminishing the worth of the grand coalition, a
balanced game may become nonbalanced. Therefore, an arbitrary balanced game may never arise from
another balanced game by just increasing the worth of the grand coalition. In order to receive a stronger
property that is similar to ESD, satisfied by the core as well, and applicable to balanced games that become
unbalanced when exclusively diminishing the worth of the grand coalition, we introduce equal adjusted
surplus division (EASD). To this end, we say that a coalition is fully exact (called “tight” by Oswald et al. [16,
definition 1]) if each core element assigns to this coalition precisely its worth in the game. Now a solution
satisfies EASD if, whenever the worth of any fully exact coalition is diminished proportionally so that the new
game remains balanced, adding equal shares to any element of the solution of the new game yields an element
of the solution of the original game [see (5) and (6) for the formal definition].
We show that the per capita nucleolus on the set of balanced games with coinciding player sets N of n ⩾ 2
elements is axiomatized by SIVA, TCOV, SCOV, and EASD. On all games with player sets N, ESD is needed in
addition to characterize the per capita prenucleolus.
It turns out that ESD and EASD can be translated to independence of proportional shifting (IPS) and in-
dependence of adjusted proportional shifting (IAPS). A game arises from another game by proportional
shifting if the worth of any proper coalition is increased proportionally to its size. Now IPS requires that a
solution element of the latter game belong to the solution of the proportionally shifted games as well. The
game arises by adjusted proportional shifting if only those coalitions that are not fully exact are shifted, and
IAPS refers to the corresponding independence axiom. Hence, the per capita (pre)nucleolus on the set of
balanced (all) games is axiomatized by SIVA, TCOV, SCOV, and IAPS (and IPS).
The properties IPS and IAPS may be generalized to any weight system p. Instead of shifting proportionally,
the shifting of a coalition has to be proportional to the inverse weight of this coalition. We prove that each weighted
(pre)nucleolus is characterized by SIVA, TCOV, SCOV, and suitably defined independence axiom(s) for the cor-
responding weight system. Hence, for example, the (pre)nucleolus is axiomatized without any reference to reduced
games. It should be noted that all employed axioms except SIVA are also satisfied by the core.
We now briefly review the contents of this paper. Section 2 offers the necessary notation, recalls the relevant
definitions of the considered solutions and related concepts, contains a list of properties of solutions, and
provides the well-known Kohlberg [11] criterion. In Section 3, we investigate which weighted nucleoli satisfy
SAM. We generalize the inequalities characterizing symmetric weighted nucleoli that satisfy SAM in the three-
person case provided by Housman and Clark [8] to the n-person case. However, the conditions remain
necessary only in the general n-person case. Without assuming symmetry, we show that a weighted (pre)
nucleolus satisfies regular SAM as defined by Calleja and Llerena [2] if and only if the weight system is regular
(i.e., associated with a positive payoff vector). As a consequence, a weighted prenucleolus satisfies ESD if and
only if it is the per capita prenucleolus. We prove the continuity of the mapping that assigns, to each weight
system and game, the corresponding weighted prenucleolus and use this continuity to show that the set of
weight systems generating weighted prenucleoli that satisfy SAM is open, implying, in particular, that SAM is
satisfied by any weighted prenucleolus if the weights are close enough to some regular weight system.
Section 4 is devoted to the axiomatization of the per capita (pre)nucleolus without making use of any reduced
game property. Section 5 presents the new properties IPS and IAPS; shows that these properties are equivalent
to ESD and EASD, respectively, for solutions that satisfy TCOV; and that TCOV is crucial. In Section 6, IPS
and IAPS are generalized to ISp and IASp, the corresponding properties depending on the weight system p. Thus,
the p-weighted nucleolus on the set of balanced games is characterized by SIVA, TCOV, SCOV, and IASp,
whereas ISp is needed in addition to characterize the p-weighted prenucleolus on the unrestricted set of TU
games on N. Hence, Theorem 4 applied to a weight system p assigning the same weight to any coalition
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provides an axiomatization of the traditional (pre)nucleolus for a fixed set of n players. Moreover, it should be
highlighted that nonsymmetrically weighted (pre)nucleoli have not been characterized before. Finally, Sec-
tion 7 offers some expansions, remarks, and comments.
2. Notation, Definitions, and Preliminaries
Let N be a finite nonempty set with n  |N| ⩾ 2. A transferable utility game (with player set N) is a mapping
v : 2N → R satisfying v(∅)  0. The set of coalitions (nonempty subsets of N) is denoted by ^ (i.e., ^  2N \ {∅}).
We often need the set
°
^ :^ \ {N} of proper coalitions, and the set of all games is denoted by Γ. Any x ∈ RN
defines the inessential game x(·) ∈ Γ defined by x(S)  ∑i∈S xi for all S ∈ ^ (and x(∅)  0). For v ∈ Γ, define
X∗(v)  x ∈ RN | x(N) ⩽ v(N){ }, the set of feasible allocations (payoff vectors),
X(v)  x ∈ RN | x(N)  v(N){ }, the set of preimputations, and
C(v)  x ∈ X∗(v) | x(S) ⩾ v(S) ∀S ∈ ^{ }, the core.
Recall that @ ⊆ ^ is balanced if there exists (δS)S∈@ such that δS > 0 for all S ∈ @ and ∑S∈@ δS1S  1N , where
1S ∈ RN is the indicator vector of S for any S ⊆ N. In such a case, (δS)S∈@ is a system of balancing weights for @.
Then @ is a minimal (w.r.t. set inclusion) balanced collection of coalitions if and only if it has a unique
collection of balancing weights. In this case, let (δ@S )S∈@ denote the unique system of balancing weights.
Remark 1. Let v ∈ Γ. According to the Bondareva–Shapley theorem (Bondareva [1], Shapley [22]), C(v) 	 ∅ if and
only if




@ ⊆ °^ is minimal balanced
{ }
: β(v).
Hence, games that have nonempty cores are called balanced.
Denote by Γb the set of balanced games. A coalition S ∈ ^ is exact (Schmeidler [20], Shapley [23]) at v ∈ Γ if
there exists x ∈ C(v) that is effective for S, that is, x(S)  v(S). Moreover, let us call S fully exact if it is exact and
all x ∈ C(v) are effective for S. Let %(v) denote the set of all fully exact coalitions at v, that is,
%(v)  {S ∈ ^ | S is exact at v and x(S)  v(S) for all x ∈ C(v)}.
Hence, if v ∈ Γb, then N ∈ %(v). Let °%(v)  %(v) \ {N}. Then, for any S ∈ ^ \ %(v), there exists xS ∈ C(v) with
xS(S) > v(S). Because C(v) is convex, we conclude that there exists x ∈ C(v) such that x(S) > v(S) for all
S ∈ ^ \ %(v). Note that by the mentioned Bondareva–Shapley theorem, the following relations are valid for any
v ∈ Γ:
β(v) > v(N)⇐⇒%(v)  ∅⇐⇒C(v)  ∅ , (1)
β(v)  v(N)⇐⇒ °%(v) 	 ∅ , (2)
β(v) < v(N)⇐⇒%(v)  {N} . (3)
A solution is a mapping σ that assigns a subset σ(v) of X∗(v) to any v ∈ Γ. Its restriction to a set Γ′ ⊆ Γ is again
denoted by σ. Moreover, a solution on Γ′ is the restriction to Γ′ of some solution.
A solution σ on Γ′ ⊆ Γ satisfies
• single-valuedness (SIVA) if |σ(v)|  1 for all v ∈ Γ′;
• translation covariance (TCOV) if, for all v, v′ ∈ Γ′ such that v′ − v  x(·) for some x ∈ RN (i.e., v − v′ is in-
essential), it holds that σ(v′) − σ(v)  {x}, that is, σ(v′)  σ(v) + {x}, where A + B denotes the Minkowsky sum
whenever A,B ⊆ RN ;
• scale covariance (SCOV) if σ(βv)  βσ(v), whenever β > 0 and v, βv ∈ Γ′.
We often compare the solutions applied to two games v and v′ such that v(S)  v′(S) for all S$N. Hence, it is useful to
define, for each v ∈ Γ and each α ∈ R, the game v(α) that arises from v by exclusively diminishing the worth of the grand
coalition by nα. The game v(α) is called the α-diminished game of v, and it is formally defined by
v(α)(S)  v(S), if S ∈
°
^,
v(N) − nα, if S  N.
{
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A solution σ on Γ′ ⊆ Γ satisfies
• strong aggregate monotonicity (SAM) if, for all x ∈ σ(v(α)), there exists y ∈ σ(v) such that y  x (i.e., yi > xi for
all i ∈ N), whenever α > 0 and v, v(α) ∈ Γ′;
• equal surplus division (ESD) if σ(v(α)) + {α1N} ⊆ σ(v), whenever α > 0 and v, v(α) ∈ Γ′.
SIVA is clearly a desirable property of a normative solution, whereas TCOV and SCOV are widely accepted
standard properties, together traditionally called covariance under strategic equivalence. Monotonicity properties
such as SAM and ESD have been discussed, for example, by Megiddo [13], who showed that the Davis and
Maschler [4] bargaining set does not satisfy AM, defined as SAM except that just y ⩾ x is required.
Note that the solutions C(·),X(·), and X∗(·) satisfy all foregoing properties except SIVA (provided that Γ′ is
rich enough).
We now recall the definition of a “weighted (pre)nucleolus” (see, e.g., Derks and Haller [5, p. 177] and some
relevant results of Kleppe et al. [10]). A weight system is a system p  (pS)S∈ °^ such that pS > 0 for all S ∈
°
^. Let
v ∈ Γ. The p-weighted prenucleolus of v, denoted by 31p(v), is the set of preimputations x of v that lexico-
graphically minimize the nonincreasingly ordered vector (pSe(S, x, v))S∈ °^, where e(S, x, v)  v(S) − x(S) is the
excess of S ∈ ^ at x w.r.t. v. Formally, with θ : R °^ → R2n−2 defined by θt(x)  max7⊆ °^,|7|t minT∈7 xT for all
t  1, . . . , 2n − 2,
31p(v)  x ∈ X(v) | θ (pSe(S, x, v))S∈ °^
( )
⩽ lex θ (pSe(S, y, v))S∈ °^
( ) ∀y ∈ X(v){ },
where ⩽ lex denotes the lexicographical order on R2
n−2. Note that the p-weighted nucleolus of v is defined
similarly. Only X(v) is replaced by the set of imputations, that is, by {x ∈ X(v) | xi ⩾ v({i})∀i ∈ N}. It is well
known that the p-weighted prenucleolus is a singleton that we denote by νp(v). Moreover, the p-weighted
nucleolus is a singleton whenever v(N) ⩾∑i∈N v({i}). If v ∈ Γb, then both solutions coincide. The foregoing
statements may easily be derived from the results of Justman [9]. Replacing p by αp for some positive α does
not change the corresponding weighted prenucleolus, and it can be shown that the opposite is also true:
31p  31p′ if and only if p and p′ are proportional. If all weights are identical, the corresponding p-weighted
(pre)nucleolus (point) is the traditional prenucleolus (point) introduced by Schmeidler [19]. If the pS are
proportional to 1|S|, that is, pS|S|  pT |T| for all S,T ∈
°
^, then we omit the upper index p and simply write
31(v)  {ν(v)} to denote the per capita prenucleolus (see, e.g., Grotte [6]). Whether a (pre)imputation of a
game coincides with its p-weighted (pre)nucleolus point can be checked with a suitable modification of
Kohlberg’s [11] property I or property II. In order to formulate property IIp (i.e., Kohlberg’s [11] property II for
the p-weighted prenucleolus), we denote, for any α ∈ R and x ∈ X(v),
$p(α, x, v) 
{
S ∈ °^ | pSe(S, x, v) ⩾ α
}
.
Then x has property IIp if, for any α ∈ R, $p(α, x, v) is balanced or empty. Now proposition 2.2 of Kleppe et al.
[10] implies part (a) of the following remark.
Remark 2. Let v ∈ Γ, p be a weight system, and x ∈ X(v).
(a) Then x  νp(v) if and only if x has property IIp.
(b) Let x  νp(v). If v is balanced, as x minimizes the largest p-excess, then x ∈ C(v) and x(T) > v(T) for all
T ∈ ^ \ %(v).
It is well known that the weighted prenucleoli satisfy SIVA, TCOV, and SCOV. The specialty of the per capita








S, x + α1N , v
)
+ α; (4)
that is, the per capita excesses of v(α) at x and those of v at x + α1N coincide up to a constant.
3. On Strong Aggregate Monotonicity and Weighted Prenucleoli
In this section, we introduce regular weight systems that result in weighted prenucleoli satisfying SAM. We
show that the set of weight systems generating weighted prenucleoli that satisfy SAM is open. Hence, a
p-weighted prenucleolus satisfies SAM if, for example, p is close enough to a regular weight system. Moreover,
as a consequence of a more general statement, we show that the per capita prenucleolus is the unique weighted
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prenucleolus that satisfies ESD. We also provide a necessary condition for symmetric weight systems to generate
aggregate monotonic weighted prenucleoli. Say that a solution σ on Γ′ ⊆ Γ satisfies
• regular strong aggregate monotonicity (RSAM) if there exists z ∈ RN with z  0 and z(N)  n such that
σ(v(α)) + {αz} ⊆ σ(v), whenever α > 0 and v, v(α) ∈ Γ′. In this case, we say that σ satisfies RSAM w.r.t. z.
Note that for single-valued solutions, our version of RSAM coincides with the corresponding property
introduced by Calleja and Llerena [2]. The following theorem characterizes the weighted prenucleoli that
satisfy RSAM.
Theorem 1. Let Γb ⊆ Γ′ ⊆ Γ, let p be a weight system, and let z ∈ RN satisfy z(N)  n and z  0. The solution 31p on Γ′
satisfies RSAM w.r.t. z if and only if z(Q)pQ  z(R)pR for all Q,R ∈ °^.
Proof. In order to show the if part, let p̂Q  1z(Q) for all Q ∈
°
^, α > 0, v, v(α) ∈ Γ′, and x  νp̂(v(α)). Then
p̂Se(S, x + αz, v)  v
(α)(S) − x(S) − αz(S)
z(S)  p̂Se S, x, v
(α)
( )
− α for all S ∈ °^
and x + αz(N)  v(N) so that νp̂(v)  x + αz by Remark 2.
In order to show the only if part, let p be a weight system such that there areQ,R ∈ °^ satisfying z(Q)pQ 	 z(R)pR.
It remains to show that 31p does not satisfy RSAM w.r.t. z. Choose α ⩾ max{z(T)pT | T ∈ °^}. We now define a
collection 6 of coalitions by
6  {Q,R} ∪ {{i} | i ∈ N\(Q ∪ R)}, if Q ∩ R  ∅,{Q,R, (Q ∪ R)\(Q ∩ R)} ∪ {{i} | i ∈ N\(Q ∪ R)}, if Q ∩ R 	 ∅.
{
Note that 6 is minimal balanced (with unique balancing weights δQ  δR  δ{i}  1 for all i ∈ N \ (Q ∪ R) in the
case Q ∩ R  ∅ and δQ  δR  δ(Q∪R)\(Q∩R)  12 and δ{i}  1 for all i ∈ N \ (Q ∪ R) in the case Q ∩ R 	 ∅).




, if S ∈ °^ \ 6,
0, if S ∈ 6,
n, if S  N.
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Moreover, let v′  v(1), that is, v′(S)  v(S) for all S ∈ °^ and v′(N)  0. Let x  0 ∈ RN . Then pSe(S, x, v′)  0 for
all S ∈ 6, and pTe(T, x, v′)  −α for all T ∈ °^ \ 6. Hence, v′ and v are balanced. Because 6 is balanced, it is
straightforward to deduce from part (a) of Remark 2 that x  νp(v′). Let y  x + z. It remains to show that
y 	 νp(v). Let ρ  max{pSe(S, y, v) | S ∈ °^} and 7  {T ∈ °^ | pTe(T, y, v)  ρ}. Note that for any S ∈ 6, pSe(S, y, v) 
−pSz(S) ⩾ −α. Also, for any T ∈ °^ \ 6, pTe(T, y, v)  −α − pTz(T) < −α so that 7 ⊆ 6. Now pRz(R) 	 pQz(Q)
implies that 7 $ 6. Because 6 is minimal balanced, 7  $p(ρ, y, v) is not balanced. Hence, Remark 2 shows
that y 	 νp(v) so that 31p does not satisfy RSAM w.r.t. z. □
Applied to z  1N , Theorem 1 yields the following corollary.
Corollary 1. For any Γb ⊆ Γ′ ⊆ Γ, the per capita prenucleolus is the unique weighted prenucleolus that satisfies ESD.
Note that for the only if part of the Theorem 1 (and for the uniqueness part of the preceding corollary), a
sufficiently rich set Γ′ ⊆ Γ is needed, whereas the remaining if and uniqueness parts are valid for any Γ′ ⊆ Γ. Indeed,
if no properly diminished game of anymember of Γ′ belongs to Γ′, then RSAMw.r.t. any z is vacuously satisfied for
any p-weighted prenucleolus. In the corresponding indirect proofs, we use certain balanced games to construct the
desired contradictions.
For n  2, any weighted prenucleolus satisfies SAM. Now we turn to SAM assuming n > 2. Let p  (pS)S∈ °^ be a
weight system. Recall that p is symmetric if pS may depend only on s  |S|; that is, we write pS  p(s) for all S ∈ °^ in
this case. Note that a p-weighted prenucleolus satisfies the equal treatment property if and only if it is symmetric
(see Kleppe et al. [10, theorem 3.3]). Therefore, mainly symmetrically weighted prenucleoli were discussed in the
literature. Housman andClark [8, theorem 3] show that for a symmetricweight system p in the case n  3, the p-weighted
prenucleolus satisfies SAM if p(1) > p(2) (and AM if p(1) ⩾ p(2)). We now show that the opposite is also true.
Proposition 1. Let p be a symmetric weight system, and let s, t ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, s 	 t. If sp(s) ⩽ (t − 1)p(t), then 31p does
not satisfy SAM. If sp(s) < (t − 1)p(t), then 31p does not satisfy AM.
Proof. We may assume that t > 1. Let i0 ∈ N, 6  {S ⊆ N \ {i0} | s  |S|}, and 7  {T ⊆ N | i0 ∈ T, t  |T|}. Note
that6 ∪7 is balanced. Indeed, |7|  n−1t−1
( )
, and every j ∈ N \ {i0} is amember of n−2t−2
( )
elements of7 and amember of
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elements of 6. Therefore, it is straightforward to show that with δS  (n−t)(s−1)!(n−s−1)!(n−1)! for all S ∈ 6 and δT 
(t−1)!(n−t)!
(n−1)! for all T ∈ 7,
∑
R∈6∪7 δR1R  1N . Moreover, {1R | R ∈ 6 ∪7} spans RN so that, for any 6 ∪7 ⊆ @ ⊆ °^, we
conclude that @ is balanced (see, e.g., Sudhölter [25, remark 2.7(i)]). Choose v ∈ Γ by v(R)  0 for all R ∈ 6 ∪7,
v(N)  n, and v(S)  γ for all other S ∈ °^, where γ is some negative constant. Moreover, let v′  v(1); that is, v′(S) 
v(S) for all S ∈ °^ and v′(N)  0. Let x  0 ∈ RN . By Remark 2, x  νp(v′). With a  np(t)sp(s)+(n−t)p(t), define y ∈ RN by yi  a
for all i ∈ N \ {i0} and yi0  n − (n − 1)a. Then y ∈ X(v) and p(|R|)e(R, y, v)  − snp(s)p(t)sp(s)+(n−t)p(t)  b for all R ∈ 6 ∪7, and if
γ is small enough, p(|Q|)e(Q, y, v) < b for all Q ∈ °^ \ (6 ∪7). Hence, by Remark 2, y  νp(v). Now, if 31p sat-
isfies SAM, then y  x, that is, n − (n − 1)a > 0. Inserting the formula for a and eliminating the denominator yield
nsp(s) + n(n − t)p(t) − n(n − 1)p(t) > 0, that is, sp(s) > (t − 1)p(t). Similarly, if 31p satisfies AM, we receive sp(s) ⩾
(t − 1)p(t). □
Note that Proposition 1, applied to s  1 and t  3, reproves that the traditional nucleolus (all weights coincide)
does not satisfy aggregate monotonicity if n ⩾ 4 (see also Megiddo [13] for n ⩾ 9), which was already shown by
Hokari [7] even for the set of convex games.
As mentioned earlier, the opposite statement of Proposition 1 is correct for n  3 (Housman and Clark [8]), but
the inequalities sp(s) > (t − 1)p(t) for all s, t ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} do not guarantee that the p-weighted prenucleolus
satisfies SAM. For instance, it may be shown similarly to Proposition 1 that 2p(3) > p(2) is necessary for SAM if
n > 4.
In general, we do not have a characterization of the weight systems p such that the p-weighted prenucleoli satisfy
SAM. However, we now show that the set of weight systems p, not necessarily symmetric, generating p-weighted
prenucleoli that satisfy SAM is open.
To this end, the following two lemmas are needed. Let 0 ⊆ R °^ denote the set of all weight systems. A suitable
adjustment of the well-known proof of the continuity of the classical prenucleolus allows us to show that any
weighted prenucleolus is continuous as well. However, we need the following stronger result.
Lemma 1. Let f : Γ ×0 → RN defined by f (v, p)  νp(v) for all v ∈ Γ and p ∈0. Then f is continuous.
Proof. Let v, vk ∈ Γ and p, pk ∈0 for all k ∈ N such that limk→∞ vk  v and limk→∞ pk  p. For each k ∈ N, let
xk  νpk (vk).
Claim 1. The set {xk | k ∈ N} is bounded. Indeed, let y ∈ RN be such that y(N) ⩽ infk∈N vk(N), which is finite because
{vk(N) | k ∈ N} is bounded. Moreover, {pkSe(S, y, vk) | S ∈ °^, k ∈ N} is bounded so that d  supk∈N,S∈ °^ pkSe(S, y, vk)
exists. Now choose zk ∈ RN such that zk ⩾ y and zk(N)  vk(N). Then pkSe(S, y, vk) ⩾ pkSe(S, zk, vk) for all S ∈ °^ and
maxS∈ °^ p
k
Se(S, xk, vk) ⩽ maxS∈ °^ pkSe(S, zk, vk) ⩽ d. We conclude that for all k ∈ N, we have
xk(N)  vk(N) and pkSe S, xk, vk
( )
⩽ d for all S ∈ °^.
In particular, pk{i}(vk({i}) − xki ) ⩽ d, that is, xki ⩾ vk({i}) − d/pk{i}, for all k ∈ N and i ∈ N, and our claim follows.
Let (xkj )j∈N be a convergent subsequence of (xk)k∈N, and let x  limj→∞ xkj . We have to prove that x  νp(v). Let
α ∈ R be such that $p(α, x, v) 	 ∅. By Remark 2, it remains to show that $p(α, x, v) is balanced. Choose ε > 0 such
that $p(α − 2ε, x, v)  $p(α, x, v). Because limj→∞ xkj  x, limj→∞ vkj  v, and limj→∞ pkj  p, there exists J ∈ N such
that
pSe(S, x, v) − ε < pkjS e S, xkj , vkj
( )
< pSe(S, x, v) + ε for all S ∈ °^ and j > J.
Therefore, $p(α, x, v)  $pkj (α − ε, xkj , vkj ) for all j > J. Because xkj  νpkj (vkj ) for all j ∈ N, $p(α, x, v) is balanced by
Remark 2. □
In order to prove the second lemma, it is useful to introduce some notation. An ordered partition of
°
^ is a
system (@1, . . . ,@t) for some t ∈ N such that for all j, k ∈ {1, . . . , t} with j 	 k, ∅ 	 @k ⊆ °^, @j ∩@k  ∅, and⋃t
1 @  °^. Let B  (@1, . . . ,@t) be an ordered partition, p ∈0, and x ∈ RN . For each j ∈ {1, . . . , t}, let
(@j1, . . . ,@jtj) be the ordered partition of @j such that for all i,  ∈ {1, . . . , tj} with  < tj, (a) @ji 	 ∅, (b) pSx(S) 
pTx(T) for all S,T ∈ @ji, and (c) pSx(S) < pTx(T) for all S ∈ @j and T ∈ @j+1. We put
Bpx 
(
@11, . . . ,@
1
t1 , . . . ,@
t




and note that Bpx is a refinement of B.
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Moreover, we say that B is a configuration if
⋃k
1 @ is balanced for all k ∈ {1, . . . , t}.
Let v ∈ Γ, p ∈0, x ∈ RN , and Bpv,x  (@1, . . . ,@t) be the ordered partition defined by the requirements that
for all j, k ∈ {1, . . . , t} with j < t, (a) @k 	 ∅, (b) pSe(S, x, v)  pTe(T, x, v) for all S, T ∈ @k, and (c)
pSe(S, x, v)> pTe(T, x, v) for all S ∈ @j and T ∈ @j+1. If x ∈ X(v), then, by Remark 2, Bpv,x is a configuration if
and only if x  νp(v).
The following lemma is needed.
Lemma 2. Let p∗ ∈0 be such that the p∗-weighted prenucleolus satisfies SAM. For any configuration B, there exists ε > 0
such that for any p ∈0 with ‖p − p∗‖ < ε, where ‖ · ‖ denotes the Euclidean norm, there exists x ∈ RN such that x  0,
x(N)  n, and Bpx is a configuration.
Proof. We may assume without loss of generality that p∗S < 1n for all S ∈
°
^. Let B  (@1, . . . ,@t) be a configuration
and define, for any p ∈0, vp,wp ∈ Γ by vp(S)  wp(S)  − jpS for all S ∈ @j and all j ∈ {1, . . . , t}, vp(N)  0, and




∗  0. By Lemma 1, there exists ε > 0 such that xp  0 for all p ∈0with ‖p − p∗‖ < ε,
andwemay assume that ε is small enough such that, in addition, pS < 1n for all S ∈
°
^. We conclude that for all S ∈ @j
and all j ∈ {1, . . . , t}, −j > pSe(S, xp,wp) > −j − 1 because n  xp(N) > xp(S) > 0 and pS < 1n, which guarantees that
B
p
wp,xp  Bpxp . □
The foregoing lemma enables us to prove the following result.
Theorem 2. The set of weight systems p such that the p-weighted prenucleolus satisfies SAM is open.
Proof. Let p∗ ∈0 be such that the p∗-weighted prenucleolus satisfies SAM. It remains to show that for any p ∈0
close enough to p∗, the p-weighted prenucleolus satisfies SAM as well. By Lemma 2, for any configuration B, there
exists ε(B) > 0 such that for all p ∈0 with ‖p − p*‖ < ε(B), there is xp ∈ RN , xp  0, xp(N)  n such that Bpxp is a
configuration. Because the number of configurations is finite, there exists ε > 0 such that ε ⩽ ε(B) for all con-
figurations B. Let ‖p − p∗‖ < ε. We claim that 31p satisfies SAM. Assume, on the contrary, that there exists
v ∈ Γ and α0 < 0 such that νp(v(α0)) − νp(v) 	 0. By continuity of the p-weighted prenucleolus, we may assume that
νp(v(α)) − νp(v) 	 0 for all α with α0 ⩽ α < 0. Indeed, if νp(v(α1))  νp(v) for some α0 < α1 < 0, then α2 
min{α ∈ R | α0 ⩽ α ⩽ α1, νp(v(α)) ⩾ νp(v(α1))} is well defined by continuity so that we may in this case replace v
by v(α2)and α0 by α0 − α2. Let x  νp(v) and B  Bpv,x. Then there exists α0 ⩽ δ < 0 such that Bpv(δ),x−δxp  Bpxp so that, by
Remark 2 and Lemma 2, x − δxp  νp(v(δ)). Because δ < 0 and xp  0, x − δxp  x, and the desired contradiction is
obtained. □
We call a weight system p regular if there exists z ∈ RN with z  0 and z(N)  n such that z(Q)pQ  z(R)pR for
all Q,R ∈ °^. Theorems 1 and 2 have the following immediate consequence.
Corollary 2. For any p ∈0 that is close enough to some regular weight system, the p-weighted prenucleolus satisfies SAM.
4. Characterizations of the Per Capita Prenucleolus
In order to present our axiomatization of the per capita prenucleolus, first, on the set of balanced games,
without employing any reduced game property, we recall that for any v ∈ Γb, by (3), v(α) is balanced if and only
if nα ⩽ v(N) − β(v). Therefore, if β(v)  v(N), there does not exist α > 0 such that v(α) is still balanced. In order to
define a property that is similar to ESD but also applicable when β(v)  v(N), we define the following
modification of v(α), called the adjusted α-diminished game of v and denoted by v(α,adj). Namely, for v ∈ Γb and
α ⩾ 0, v(α,adj) ∈ Γ is defined by
v(α,adj)(S)  v(S) − α|S|, if S ∈ %(v),
v(S), if S ∈ ^ \ %(v).
{
(5)
Note that if α > 0 is small enough, then v(α,adj) remains balanced. Indeed, there exists x ∈ C(v) such that x(S) >
v(S) for all S ∈ ^ \ %(v). Now define x(α)  x − α1N and observe that x(α)(T)  v(α,adj)(T) for all T ∈ %(v) and
|x(S) − x(α)(S)|  |S|α < nα for S ∈ ^ \ %(v). Hence, x(α)(S) ⩾ v(S) for α small enough.
A solution σ on Γ′ ⊆ Γ satisfies








whenever α > 0 and v, v(α,adj) ∈ Γ′ ∩ Γb.
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Note that EASD may be interpreted similarly to ESD. Recall that a solution satisfies ESD if the solution to a
game contains each proposal that arises from an element of the solution to a game in which just the worth of
the grand coalition is diminished, namely, by adding equal shares for each player of this additional worth of
the grand coalition. EASD also requires adding equal shares of the additional worth of the grand coalition.
This requirement can be justified by observing that the set of fully exact coalitions forms a balanced collection,
and thus, with respect to the original game v, all players are equally undervalued in the adjusted α-diminished
game v(α,adj). Moreover, in order to keep v(α,adj) balanced, not only is the worth of the grand coalition di-
minished, but also the worth of any fully exact coalition is diminished proportionally to its size.
Note that C(·),X(·), and X*(·) satisfy EASD. Though EASD of the per capita nucleolus follows from more
general results of Sections 5 and 6, we provide a separate argument. If α > 0, v, v(α,adj) ∈ Γb, x  ν(v(α,adj)), and
y  x + α1N , then e(T, x, v(α,adj))  e(T, y, v)  0 for all T ∈ %(v) and, for any S ∈ ^ \ %(v), v(α,adj)(S)  v(α)(S) so that
as x ∈ C(v(α,adj)), e(S, y, v)/|S|  e(S, x, v(α,adj))/|S| − α (see (4)), and hence, by Remark 2, y  ν(v).
Theorem 3. On Γb, the per capita nucleolus is the unique solution that satisfies SIVA, TCOV, SCOV, and EASD.
We have seen that the per capita nucleolus satisfies the properties in Theorem 3, so the existence part is
already shown. The uniqueness part of Theorem 3 is implied by Theorem 4(a) applied to a per capita weight
system together with Proposition 2. The general proof may be regarded as a generalization of the approach
presented in the following illustrating three-person example.
Example 1. Let N  {1, 2, 3} and v  v1 be given by
v({1})  3, v({2})  6, v({3})  7, v({1, 2})  17, v({1, 3})  14, v({2, 3})  13, v(N)  32.
Then (9, 10, 13) ∈ C(v), and hence, %(v)  {N}; that is, v(α,adj)  v(α) for all α > 0. Let v2  v(8/3). Then v2(S)  v(S)
for all S ∈ °^ and v2(N)  24; hence, (9, 8, 7) ∈ C(v2), v2({1, 2}) + v2({3})  v2(N), and %(v2)  {N, {1, 2}, {3}}. Let
v3  v(1,adj)2 . Hence, v3(N)  21, v3({1, 2})  15, v3({3})  6, and C(v3)  {(8, 7, 6)}, implying that %(v3)  ^\
{{1}, {2}}. With v4  v(1,adj)3 , we receive v4({1})  v({1})  3, C(v4)  {(7, 6, 5)}, and %(v4)  ^ \ {{1}} so that v5 
v(4,adj)4 is the additive game defined by the vector y  (3, 2, 1). Now, if σ is a solution that satisfies SIVA, TCOV,
and SCOV, then σ(v5)  {y}, as shown in the proof of Theorem 4(a). If σ satisfies EASD in addition, then we
receive y4  y + (4, 4, 4) ∈ σ(v4), y3  y4 + (1, 1, 1) ∈ σ(v3), y2  y3 + (1, 1, 1) ∈ σ(v2), and x  y2 + (8/3, 8/3, 8/3) 
1
3 (35, 32, 29) ∈ σ(N, v). Because %(v1)$ · · ·$%(v5), each of the chosen α values is maximal such that the cor-
responding α-diminished adjusted game is balanced.
In order to reconfirm that, indeed, x  ν(v), first notice that possible per capita excesses are 0,−8/3,−11/3,−14/3,
and −26/3, and they are attained by the coalitions in%(v),%(v2) \ %(v),%(v3) \ %(v2),%(v4) \ %(v3), and%(v5) \ %(v4),
respectively. By Remark 2, it remains to check that %(vi) \ {N}, i  2, . . . , 5, is balanced. Now %(v2) \ {N} is a
partition and, hence, balanced. Balancing weights of the other collections are, respectively,(
δ{3}, δ{1,2}, δ{1,3}, δ{2,3}
)
 (1/3, 2/3, 1/3, 1/3),(
δ{2}, δ{3}, δ{1,2}, δ{1,3}, δ{2,3}
)
 (1/4, 1/4, 1/2, 1/2, 1/4), and(
δ{1}, δ{2}, δ{3}, δ{1,2}, δ{1,3}, δ{2,3}
)
 (1/3, 1/3, 1/3, 1/3, 1/3, 1/3).
Remark 3. (a) Each of the axioms employed in Theorem 3 is logically independent of the remaining axioms. Indeed,
X(·), that is, the solution that assigns to each game its set of preimputations, exclusively violates SIVA, and the equal
split solution (assigning with each v ∈ Γ the singleton {x} defined by xi  v(N)n ) exclusively violates TCOV. Let
π : N → {1, . . . , n} be an order of N, that is, a bijection. For any v ∈ Γ, define aπ  aπ(v) ∈ RN by aπi  v(Pπi ∪ {i}) −
v(Pπi ) for all i ∈ N, where Pπi  {j ∈ N | π(j) < π(i)}. Note that the Shapley value (Shapley [21]) of v is the average of
all aπ(v) taken over all orderings of N. Now, by its definition, the solution {aπ(·)} satisfies SIVA, SCOV, and TCOV
so that it violates exclusively EASD. Finally, let z ∈ RN \ {0} be such that z(N) ⩽ 0 and define σ(v)  31(v) + {z} for
all v ∈ Γb. Then σ exclusively violates SCOV.
(b) The foregoing properties of the solutions hold for any Γ′ with Γb ⊆ Γ′ ⊆ Γ.
(c) However, the solution that assigns the per capita prenucleolus to each game in Γb and {aπ(v)} to each game in
v ∈ Γ′ \ Γb satisfies the four axioms of the theorem because {aπ(·)} satisfies the former three axioms, Γb is closed
under strategic equivalence, and EASD refers only to Γb.
Corollary 3. Let Γb ⊆ Γ′ ⊆ Γ. The per capita prenucleolus on Γ′ is the unique solution that satisfies SIVA, TCOV, SCOV,
EASD, and ESD.
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Proof. We have seen that 31 satisfies ESD, and by Theorem 3, it also satisfies the remaining axioms. For the
uniqueness part, let σ be a solution that satisfies the axioms. Moreover, let v ∈ Γ′. If v is balanced, then σ(v)  31(v)
by Theorem 3. Otherwise, let α  v(N)−β(v)n . By SIVA, there exists x ∈ RN such that σ(v)  {x} and, by ESD and SIVA,
σ(v(α))  {y}, where y  x − α1N . Because v(α) is balanced, 31(v(α))  σ(v(α)) so that x  ν(v) by ESD of 31. □
In view of Remark 3, each of the axioms employed in Corollary 3 is logically independent of the remaining
axioms.
In view of (1), (2), and (3), for solutions on Γb, EASD implies ESD. Because both the Shapley value and the
per capita prenucleolus satisfy SIVA, TCOV, SCOV, and ESD on Γb, it follows that ESD does not replace EASD
in Theorem 3 provided that n ⩾ 3.
Finally, we note that although ESD is weaker than EASD on Γb, it is not satisfied by any weighted nucleolus
except the per capita nucleolus by Corollary 1.
5. Independence of (Adjusted) Proportional Shifting
Let v ∈ Γ and α ∈ R. We recall the notation of the “α-shift” game w of v (see Sudhölter [25, definition 4.3]):
w(S)  v(S) + α, if S ∈
°
^,
v(S), if S  N.
{
We define the proportional α-shift game v(α) of v by
v(α)(S)  v(S) + α|S|, if S ∈
°
^,




v(α)  v(α) − α1N(·) (8)
Moreover, if v ∈ Γb, we define the adjusted proportional α-shift game of v by
v α,adj( )(S) 
v(S) + α|S|, if S ∈ ^ \ %(v),




v α,adj( )  v α,adj( ) − α1N(·). (10)
Now we are ready to define our independence axioms. A solution σ on Γ′ ⊆ Γ satisfies
• independence of proportional shifting (IPS) if σ v(α)
( ) ⊆ σ(v), whenever α > 0 and v, v(α) ∈ Γ′;
• independence of adjusted proportional shifting (IAPS) if σ(v(α,adj)) ⊆ σ(v), whenever α > 0 and v, v(α,adj) ∈ Γ′ ∩ Γb.
Hence, by (8) and (10), we have the following result.
Proposition 2. Let Γ′ ⊆ Γ, and let σ be a solution on Γ′ that satisfies TCOV. Then we have the following:
(a) If Γ′ is closed under translations, that is, v ∈ Γ′, x ∈ RN implies v + x(·) ∈ Γ′, then σ satisfies ESD if and only if σ
satisfies IPS.
(b) If Γ′ ∩ Γb is closed under translations, then σ satisfies EASD if and only if σ satisfies IAPS.
The following corollary is a special case (that of a per capita weight system) of Theorem 4 of Section 6. The
logical independence of each of the employed axioms is also proved in that section.
Corollary 4. (a) The per capita nucleolus is the unique solution on Γb that satisfies SIVA, TCOV, SCOV, and IAPS.
(b) On an arbitrary Γ′, Γb ⊆ Γ′ ⊆ Γ, the per capita prenucleolus is the unique solution that satisfies SIVA, TCOV,
SCOV, IAPS, and IPS.
The remainder of this section is devoted to a discussion of the impact of TCOV in Proposition 2.
The solution that assigns to each game v the per capita prenucleolus if v(N) < 0 and the equal split solution if
v(N) ⩾ 0 satisfies the two independence axioms but violates each of the equal division axioms, provided that
Γ′ ∩ Γb is rich enough. Hence, in general, IPS does not imply ESD, nor does IAPS imply EASD.
As mentioned earlier, by the Bondareva–Shapley theorem, there exists a smallest real number β(v) such that
if v(N) is replaced by β(v), the game is balanced. Now we may consider the solution that assigns the equal split
solution to any game v satisfying β(v) < 0 and the per capita prenucleolus to any other game. This solution
satisfies ESD but violates IPS, provided that Γ′ is rich enough. Hence, in general, ESD does not imply IPS.
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Finally, by induction on
t(v)  e(S, x, v)|S|
⃒⃒⃒⃒
S ∈ ^ \ %(v)
{ }⃒⃒⃒⃒ ⃒⃒⃒⃒
, where x  ν(v), (11)
we define a solution σ on Γb that satisfies EASD but violates IAPS: if t(v)  0 (i.e., v is inessential), then
σ(v)  31(v) if v(N) ⩽ 0 and σ(v)  X(v) if v(N) > 0. Now, if t(v) ⩾ 1, then, with x  ν(v), let
α(v)  −max e(S, x, v)|S|
{ ⃒⃒⃒⃒
S ∈ ^ \ %(v)
}
, (12)
and observe that {α ⩾ 0 | v(α,adj) ∈ Γb}  [0, α(v)] and α(v) > 0. Let v′  v(α(v),adj). By EASD of the per capita
prenucleolus, t(v′)  t(v) − 1; hence, σ(v′) is already defined by the inductive hypothesis. We now define
σ(v)  σ(v′) + {α(v)1N}. Again, by induction on t(v), it may be shown that σ satisfies EASD. However, it does
not satisfy IAPS.
Remark 4. We now verify that EASD and SIVA imply IAPS for any solution σ on Γb. Indeed, let σ satisfy SIVA and
EASD. Let v ∈ Γb, α > 0, and w  v + α1N(·). By (10), it suffices to prove that σ(w)  σ(v) + {α1N}. We proceed by
induction on t(v) defined by (11). If t(v)  0, that is, v is inessential (%(v)  ^(v)), then w is also inessential
(i.e., %(w)  %(v)), so v  w(α,adj), and the proof is finished by SIVA and EASD. If t(v) > 0, then TCOV of the per
capita nucleolus guarantees that %(v)  %(w) and α(v)  α(w), where α(v) and α(w) are defined as in (12), and
with v′  v(α(v),adj) and w′  w(α(w),adj), t(v′)  t(w′)  t(v) − 1, and w′  v′ + α1N(·). Hence, by the inductive hy-
pothesis, σ(w′)  σ(v′) + {α1N}, so again by SIVA and EASD, σ(v)  σ(w), and the proof is complete.
6. Generalizing the Independence Axioms to Arbitrary Weight Systems




, if S ∈ °^,
v(N), if S  N,
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩ (13)




, if S ∈ ^ \ %(v),
v(S), if S ∈ %(v).
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩ (14)
Now we can suitably modify our independence axioms. A solution σ on Γ′ ⊆ Γ satisfies
• independence of p-shifting (ISp) if σ(v(α,p)) ⊆ σ(v), whenever α > 0 and v, v(α,p) ∈ Γ′;
• independence of adjusted p-shifting (IASp) if σ(v(α,p,adj)) ⊆ σ(v), whenever α > 0 and v, v(α,p,adj) ∈ Γ′ ∩ Γb.
Lemma 3. Let p be a weight system. On any Γ′ ⊆ Γ, 31p satisfies ISp and IASp.
Proof. Let v ∈ Γ, x  νp(v), α > 0, v′  v(α,p), and S ∈ °^. Then pSe(S, x, v′)  pSe(S, x, v) + α so that ISp follows from
Remark 2(a). Now assume that v and w  v(α,p,adj) are balanced. It suffices to show that νp(w)  x. Hence, we may
assume that %(v)$^. Let y ∈ C(w). Because w(N)  v(N) and w(S) ⩾ v(S) for all S ∈ ^, y ∈ C(v). We conclude that
y(S) ⩾ v(S) + αpS, that is, pSe(S, y, v) ⩽ −α for all S ∈ ^ \ %(v). Because x lexicographically minimizes the non-
increasingly ordered vector of p-weighted excesses, pSe(S, x, v) ⩽ −α for all S ∈ ^ \ %(v) as well. Hence, x ∈ C(w) so






γ − α, x, v), if γ < 0,
Dp 0, x, v( ), if γ  0,
∅, if γ > 0.
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩




)  Dp(γ − α, x, v), if γ ⩽ 0,∅, if γ > 0.
{
In any case, x  νp(w) by Remark 2(a). □
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Theorem 4. (a) The p-weighted nucleolus is the unique solution on Γb that satisfies SIVA, TCOV, SCOV, and IASp.
(b) On any Γ′, Γb ⊆ Γ′ ⊆ Γ, the p-weighted prenucleolus is the unique solution that satisfies SIVA, TCOV, SCOV, IASp,
and ISp.
Proof. (a) It is well known that31p satisfies SIVA, TCOV, and SCOV, and by Lemma 3, it satisfies IASp. In order to
show uniqueness, let σ be a solution that satisfies SIVA, TCOV, SCOV, and IASp. Let v ∈ Γb. By SIVA, σ(v)  {x}
for some x ∈ RN . Let y  νp(v). It remains to show that x  y. Let t(v)  |{pSe(S, y, v) | S ∈ ^ \ %(v)}|. We proceed
by induction on t(v). If t(v)  0, then v is inessential. By TCOV, we may assume that v(S)  0 for all S ⊆ N. By SIVA
and SCOV, {γx}  σ(γv)  σ(v) for all γ > 0. Hence, x  y  0 ∈ RN . If t(v) > 0, then let α  −max{pSe(S, y, v) | S ∈
^ \ %(v)}. By IASp of 31p, y  νp(v(α,p,adj)) so that t(v(α,p,adj))  t(v) − 1. By our induction hypothesis, σ(v(α,p,adj)) 
{y}. Hence, by IASp of σ, x  y.
(b) The p-weighted prenucleolus 31p satisfies SIVA, TCOV, SCOV, and IAPSp and ISp by Lemma 3. To show
the uniqueness part, let σ be a solution that satisfies the five foregoing axioms. Let v ∈ Γ′ and y  νp(v). By SIVA,
σ(v)  {x} for some x ∈ RN , and it remains to show that x  y. If v ∈ Γb, then x  y by part (a). Hence, we may
assume that v is not balanced. Choose α ⩾ max{pSe(S, y, v) | S ∈ °^} and observe that v′  v(−α,p) is balanced because
y ∈ C(v′). Because v  v′(α,p), by ISp of 31p, y  νp(v′). We have already proved that 31 coincides with σ on bal-
anced games, so σ(v′)  31(v′)  {y}, and the proof is finished by ISp of σ. □
By means of examples, we now show that each of the properties employed in Theorem 4 is logically
independent of the remaining properties. Indeed, X(·) exclusively violates SIVA, the equal split solution
exclusively violates TCOV, and the solution that assigns 31p + {z}, where z ∈ RN \ {0} satisfies z(N) ⩽ 0, to any
game v exclusively violates SCOV. To show that IASp is logically independent, let, for any v ∈ Γ,
α′(v)  max{α ∈ R | v(α,p) ∈ Γb}, and define σ(v)  {aπ(v(α′(v),p))}, where π is some ordering of N (see Remark 3 for
the definition of aπ(·)). Notice that v(α′(v(α,p)),p)  v(α′(v),p) for all v ∈ Γ and α ∈ R. Hence, σ is well defined. Thus, σ
satisfies ISp and SIVA. It is straightforward to check that σ also satisfies TCOV and SCOV. Finally, ISp is
exclusively violated by the solution that coincides with the p-weighted prenucleolus on Γb and with {aπ(·)} on
Γ′ \ Γb, provided that Γ′ \ Γb 	 ∅, where π is some ordering of N. To show that there is a solution of this kind
that does not coincide with 31p, choose v ∈ Γ′ \ Γb and S ∈ °^ with v(S) > x(S), where x  νp(v). Choose i ∈ S
and an ordering π such that Pπi  S \ {i}. Hence, with y  aπ(v), we receive y(S)  v(S); hence, aπ(v) 	 νp(v).
Remark 5. Let p be a weight system of the traditional prenucleolus, that is, pS  pT for all S,T ∈ °^. It should be
noted that in this case, IASp is related to the property “relative independence of slack coalitions” of Oswald et al.
[16, definition 2] that only apparently aims into the opposite direction. In our notation, and generalizing the
property suitably to set-valued solutions, a solution σ on Γb satisfies relative independence of slack coalitions if
σ(w) ⊆ σ(w(−α,p,adj)) for all w ∈ Γb and all α > 0. Our IASp implies relative independence of slack coalitions because
with v  w(−α,p,adj), w  v(α,p,adj). However, the mentioned authors need continuity in addition to characterize the
traditional nucleolus on Γb. The reason is simple. Namely, for the foregoing games w and v compared by relative
independence of slack coalitions, %(v)  %(w). For IASp, the situation may differ: if %(v) $ ∈ ^, then with α(v)
defined by (12), we receive %(v) $ %(v(α(v),p,adj)). Therefore, our property is stronger. Indeed, wewill now generalize
the set-valued version of relative independence of slack coalitions to arbitrary weight systems and provide an
example (Example 2) that shows that this property does not replace IASp in Theorem 4(a). Hence, as in the
characterization of the traditional (pre)nucleolus by Oswald et al. [16], an additional property such as continuity
would be needed when replacing IASp by the aforementioned weaker property.
We say that a solution σ on Γb satisfies p-relative independence of slack coalitions (p-RISC) if σ(v) ⊆ σ(v(−α,p,adj))
for all v ∈ Γb and all α > 0. The following example shows that p-RISC does not replace IASp in Theorem 4(a),
provided that n ⩾ 3.




, if S  {k},
−1 − t
p{}
, if S  {},
0, if S ∈ ^\{{k}, {}}.
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Note that the core of wt is the singleton {0} for any t ⩾ 0, and it is empty whenever t < 0. Moreover, wt is
strategically equivalent to wt′ (i.e., there exists β > 0 and z ∈ RN such that wt′  βwt + z(·)) if and only if t  t′.
Hence, we may define our solution σ by σ(βwt + z(·))  {βx + z} for all β, t > 0 and z ∈ RN and σ(v)  {νp(v)} for
all v ∈ Γb that are not strategically equivalent to any wt, t > 0. By construction, σ satisfies SIVA, SCOV, and
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TCOV. Moreover, if v ∈ Γb is not strategically equivalent to some wt and α > 0, then v(−α,p,adj) is also not
strategically equivalent to any wt. Finally, with v  βwt + z(·) for some t, β > 0 and z ∈ RN , we receive
v(−α,p,adj)  βwt′ + z(·), where t′  t + α/β. Hence, σ satisfies p-RISC.
7. Final Remarks
First, for any weight system p and any v ∈ Γ, the p-weighted least core of v is the set
+Cp(v)  x ∈ X(v) | max
S∈ °^
pSe(S, x, v) ⩽ max
S∈ °^
pSe(S, y, v) for all y ∈ X(v)
{ }
.
Hence, the p-weighted least core contains the p-weighted (pre)nucleolus. Similarly to Kohlberg’s [11] property
II for the p-weighted prenucleolus (see Remark 2), it may be shown that the p-weighted least core is char-
acterized by the following property: let x ∈ X(v) and α0(x, v)  maxS∈ °^ pSe(S, x, v). Then x ∈ +Cp(v) if and only if
$p(α0(x, v), x, v) contains a balanced subset. Using this property, it can be shown that +Cp satisfies IASp and ISp
and that the per capita least core satisfies IAPS, IPS, EASD, and ESD. It is well known that +Cp satisfies TCOV
and SCOV. Clearly, +Cp(v) is a nonempty and bounded set. Therefore, in our characterization results, SIVA
cannot be replaced by nonemptiness (requiring that the solution assigns a nonempty set to any game under
consideration) even if Pareto efficiency (requiring that the solution assign a subset of X(v) to each game v under
consideration) and boundedness are required in addition.
Second, any p-weighted (pre)nucleolus may be regarded as a nucleolus for games with permissible coalitions and
permissible preimputations in the sense of Maschler et al. [12, p. 87], who characterize this solution (see their
theorem 6.4 and corollary 6.5) on sets of truncated games as the largest solution that satisfies “nondiscrim-
ination” (P1), “redundancy” (P2), “being contained in the least core” (P3), and a “reduced game property” (P13)
that requires reducing the set of feasible coalitions and the set of preimputaions rather than the player set.
Here, truncation requires both allowing restriction of the game to subsets of coalitions and restriction of the set
of corresponding preimputations. However, the result applies only to sets of truncated games with a fixed
finite player set N that are rich enough. If only traditional games v on ^ and all elements of X(N, v) have to be
considered, then (P1), (P2), and (P13) are vacuously satisfied for any solution, and (P3) is not sufficient to
characterize a solution. However, the reduced game property may be regarded as a reduced game property w.r.t.
the population (for more details, see the comment containing (6.5) of Maschler et al. [12]) for suitable reduced
games (e.g., the Davis-Maschler reduced game). Nevertheless, for example, Sobolev’s [24] traditional axi-
omatization of the prenucleolus requires an infinite universe of potential players. As soon as the domain is
restricted to consist of all games with player sets belonging to a finite universe, Sobolev’s [24] axioms (SIVA,
anonymity, TCOV, SCOV, and the reduced game property w.r.t. Davis–Maschler reduced games), even
together with the axiom requiring the solution to be contained in the least core (P3), are not sufficient to
characterize the prenucleolus, as can be seen by inspecting exercises 6.3.2 and 6.3.3 of Peleg and Sudhölter [18].
Third, theorem 5.2 of Kleppe et al. [10] axiomatizes a weighted prenucleolus exclusively for symmetric
weight systems. Hence, Theorem 4 may be regarded as an advantage over the mentioned axiomatization
because it also characterizes p-weighted (pre)nucleoli when p is not symmetric.
Fourth, for the special class of nonsymmetric weight systems p that result in p-weighted prenucleoli sat-
isfying RSAM (see Section 3), we may proceed as in Section 4 and define, for any z ∈ RN with z  0 and
z(N)  n, for any v ∈ Γb, and for any α ∈ R,
v α,z,adj( )(S)  v(S), if S ∈ ^ \ %(v),
v(S) − αz(S), if S ∈ %(v).
{
(15)
Then we may say that a solution σ on a set Γ′ of games satisfies regular adjusted strong aggregate monotonicity
(RASAM) w.r.t. z if σ(v(α,z,adj)) + {αz} ⊆ σ(v), whenever α > 0 and v, v(α,z,adj) ∈ Γ′ ∩ Γb.
Defining the weight system p(z)  p by pS  1z(S) for all S ∈
°
^, we receive, as in Section 5, v(α)  v(α,p(z)) − αz(·)
and v(α,z,adj)  v(α,p(z),adj) − αz(·), respectively. Because RSAM and RASAM w.r.t. z  1N coincide with ESD and
EASD, respectively, the following result that is an immediate consequence of Theorem 4 generalizes Theorem 3
and Corollary 3.
Corollary 5. Let z ∈ RN be such that z  0 and z(N)  n. Let p be the weight system defined by pS  1z(S) for all S ∈
°
^. Then
we have the following:
(a) The p-weighted nucleolus is the unique solution on Γb that satisfies SIVA, TCOV, SCOV, and RASAM w.r.t. z.
(b) On an arbitrary Γ′, Γb ⊆ Γ′ ⊆ Γ, the p-weighted prenucleolus is the unique solution that satisfies SIVA, TCOV,
SCOV, and RASAM and RSAM, both w.r.t. z.
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